Abstract: Given a purely atomic probability measure with support on n points, P , any meanpreserving contraction of P , Q, with support on m > n points is a mixture of mean-preserving contractions of P , each with support on most n points. We illustrate an application of this result towards competitive Bayesian persuasion.
Introduction
Here we prove a simple result pertaining to statistical experiments, as first introduced and promulgated in Blackwell (1951) [3] and soon after in Blackwell (1953) [4] and Blackwell and Girshick (1954) [5] .
Other important related works include Hardy, Littlewood and Pólya (1959) [8] , Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) [10] , and more recently Athey and Levin (2018) [1] . See also Rasmusen and Petrakis (1992) [9] who establish a result in a similar spirit to this one; that any four-point mean-preserving spread can be constructed from two three-point mean-preserving spreads.
Throughout we use the language introduced in Elton and Hill (1992) [6] , who introduce the idea of a "fusion" of a probability distribution. There, in a general formulation, they define a fusion of a probability distribution P as a probability distribution that can be obtained by "fusing" together parts of P . Indeed, the intuition they provide is physical: think of the probability measure as cups of liquid and hence a fusion is any distribution that can be obtained by pouring parts of various cups together.
Elton and Hill denote the class of fusions of P by F(P ) and show that Q being a fusion of P is equivalent to P ≻ C Q, which denotes that P convexly dominates Q. Equivalently, P is a meanpreserving spread of Q.
The main result of this paper establishes that given a purely atomic probability measure P with support on n points, any fusion of P , Q, with support on n + 1 points is the convex combination of two fusions of P , Q 1 and Q 2 , each of which have support on at most n points. An important corollary of this result, Corollary 1.5, is that any fusion Q of P is a mixture of fusions with support on at most n / 2 points. Corollary 1.5 has useful ramifications for competitive Bayesian persuasion problems: instead of checking deviations to any mean preserving contraction of P , one need check only deviations to mean preserving contractions with support on n points. In Subsection 1.2 we present a simple competitive persuasion problem in which this result is used.
The Main Result
Throughout, identify vectors with bold font. Let X = R and denote by B the Borel subsets of X.
Moreover, let P denote the set of Borel probability measures on (X, P). Let P ∈ P be a purely atomic probability measure with support on n points i.e. suppP = a := {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n }, with respective masses p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n , where p i > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n and n i p i = 1. Without loss of generality, a 1 < a 2 < · · · < a n .
For M ∈ B we say that M has finite first P -moment if M ||x||dP (x) < ∞. Throughout, we assume that every M has finite first P -moment. Define µ := X ||x||dP (x) < ∞. Theorem 1.1. Let Q ∈ F (P ) be any fusion of P with support on n + 1 points, n ≥ 2. Then Q is the convex combination of two purely atomic probability measures Q 1 and Q 2 ; Q 1 , Q 2 ∈ F (P ), each with support on at most n points. Q 1 and Q 2 are unique.
Proof. A fusion of an arbitrary n-atom probability measure P with atoms, a, into n + 1 atoms, b, can be defined by the n × (n + 1) partition matrix F . Each row of F , F i , sums to 1 and denotes the partition of the weight P i at atom a i across the atoms b. To say that that Q = αQ ′ + (1 − α)Q ′′ for fusions Q, Q ′ , and Q ′′ is equivalent to saying F = αF + (1 − α)F ′′ for partition matrices F , F ′ , and F ′′ , where 0-columns are inserted into the partition matrices corresponding to the zero-probability atoms in Q ′ and Q ′′ but otherwise the ratios within columns in F ′ and F ′′ are the same as in F .
Consider F corresponding to fusion Q. Because F is an n × (n + 1) matrix, there is some subset of column vectors that is linearly dependent, and because all atoms are distinct, this subset has a minimal size of three. Hence, any of these column vectors can be expressed as a linear sum of the others, which in turn means it can be zeroed with the other vectors modified correspondingly. Then, the corresponding f j * and f j * * can be zeroed. To see that take one, say f j * :
In the new partition matrix for the new fusion,
and so Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that f j * and f j * * are not unique, i.e. that there is a third f j † that can be zeroed, where j * = j † = j * * . Without loss of generality suppose 1 ≤ j † ≤ k. Then by definition c j † ≤ c j * . Without loss of generality let c j † < c j * (in the case of an equality zeroing f j * would also zero f j † ). Thus,
the other zeroing produces the following component,
which is not permitted.
Since this zeroing uniquely determines F ′ and F ′′ , α follows as well and can be calculated from the coefficients in the linear dependence. Proof. From the above theorem, given a purely atomic probability measure P with support on n points, any fusion Q ∈ F(P ) with support on n+1 points is a convex combination of two fusions Q ′ , Q ′′ ∈ F(P )
with support on at most n points. If m = n + 1 then the result is simply Theorem 1.1. If not, simply iterate backward until the desired mixture of fusions of P with support on n points is obtained.
Taking weak limits, this result holds for fusions of P that are not purely atomic.
Simplifying Competitive Persuasion
Here we illustrate the usefulness of Corollary 1.5 in persuasion problems, and look at a simple competitive persuasion problem. General results about this problem have been established in Au and Kawai (2018) [2] . We show how our result can be used to easily show candidate vectors of strategies are (or are not) equilibria.
There are two competing sellers who wish a single buyer to purchase their good. The sellers sell an identical product with random quality: each seller's product is an independent identically distributed random variable X and Y , distributed according to the purely atomic measure P : From Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016) [7] and others, the choice of experiment by a seller is one of choosing a feasible distribution of posterior means. The set of feasible distributions of posterior means is the set of distributions that are mean-preserving contractions of the prior; each seller may choose any Q ∈ F(P ). Claim 1.6. There is a Nash Equilibrium in which both players choose the cdf F (x) := P(X ≤ x), where
Proof. From Corollary 1.5 it suffices to check that there is no profitable deviation to a fusion with where we used the fact that p + q + r = 1 and that pa + qb + rc = 1/2. Then, since a ≥ (1 − 1/(6p))/2 we have
Thus, there is no profitable deviation to any Q ∈ F(P ) with support on three points, and so Claim 1.6 is proved.
